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CALVIN PAUL STEWART, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Reply Brief of Petitioner 
 Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State 
submits this brief in reply to new matters raised in the respondent’s brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Stewart Misconstrues This Court’s Binding Precedent, 
Which, When Properly Understood, Mandates Reversal  
 The State has asked this Court to reverse the court of appeals’ decision, 
State v. Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, —P.3d—, because it conflicts with this 
Court’s binding precedent in two ways.  
 First, this Court has held that reinstating the time to appeal under rule 
4(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, is only available if a defendant can 
prove that something beyond his control prevented him from filing a timely 
-2- 
notice of appeal. State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶¶31, 42, 342 P.3d 789; State v. 
Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶¶17–19, 125 P.3d 874. The court of appeals, however, 
erroneously held that even though Stewart filed a timely notice of appeal, he 
was still eligible for reinstatement if he could prove that he was not informed 
of his right to counsel on appeal. See Pet.Br.12–26.1  
 Second, this Court has held that where a trial court does not make 
findings of fact, or its findings are inadequate, an appellate court has only 
two options: assume the trial court made findings consistent with its decision 
and affirm; or remand for further findings. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787–
88 & n.6 (Utah 1991). The court of appeals determined that the trial court did 
not make critical findings to support its order and erroneously made its own 
findings and reversed. It should have instead assumed findings consistent 
with the trial court’s ruling and affirmed. See Pet.Br.26–32.  
 Stewart defends the court of appeals’ decision. In doing so, he 
misconstrues rule 4(f) and this Court’s precedent. 
                                              
1 In preparing this reply brief, counsel for the State noticed a typo in 
Petitioner’s opening brief. On page 26, in the last paragraph before Part II, the 
fourth line should be corrected as follows: “not required to inform him again 
of his right to appeal counsel after he waived it….” 
-3- 
A. Rule 4(f) may not be used to remedy an alleged denial 
of the right to counsel on appeal 
 Stewart argues that he should get a new appeal because his first one 
was not meaningful without counsel. He also argues that this Court’s 
precedent should be disavowed. Neither argument is availing. 
1. Stewart improperly focuses his argument on 
whether his appeal without counsel was 
meaningful 
 First, Stewart asserts that the “heart” of this case is “what is required 
for a meaningful right to appeal.” Resp.Br.11; see also id. at 31 (claiming 
Stewart was deprived of right to appeal because he was denied “the right to 
meaningful access to the appellate process”). But Stewart’s argument 
misunderstands how this Court used “meaningful” when talking about 
reinstating the time to appeal.  In fact, this Court has corrected that 
misunderstanding before, explaining the relevant inquiry is not whether a 
defendant’s appeal was “meaningful,” but whether something prevented 
him in a “‘meaningful way’” from filing a timely notice of appeal. Rees, 2005 
UT 69, ¶¶17–19 (quoting Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, ¶24, 122 P.3d 628); see 
Pet.Br.18–22. Nothing prevented Stewart from filing a timely notice of 
appeal—he filed one—and Stewart does not contend otherwise. Rule 4(f), 
therefore, is inapplicable.  
-4- 
 Second, Stewart’s argument focuses on using rule 4(f) to “cure the 
deprivation of counsel on appeal.” Resp.Br.10; see id. at 11–31 (arguing that 
he was denied his right to appeal because he did not have counsel on appeal). 
That is not the purpose of the rule. The purpose is singular and narrow—to 
cure a complete deprivation of the right to appeal. Utah R. App. P. 4(f) 
(requiring a defendant to show he “was deprived of the right to appeal”). 
Nothing in the rule’s plain terms or the way it has been interpreted by this 
Court even suggests that a person who exercised his right to appeal can use 
the rule to get a second appeal based on an alleged denial of the right to 
counsel on the first appeal. That is not what the rule is for.  
 Stewart argues, however, that “[w]hen a defendant is deprived of 
counsel on appeal, his right to appeal is deprived.” Resp.Br.10. He relies on a 
number of cases, including from the United States Supreme Court, 
interpreting the right to counsel. See Resp.Br.11–21. Stewart’s reliance on 
these cases is misplaced.  
 Stewart claims that “implicit” in the holding of Douglas v. People of State 
of California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), is that the right to counsel at trial is separate 
from the right to counsel on appeal and that a valid waiver of the former does 
not waive the latter. Resp.Br.13. The Douglas Court held that the defendants 
were denied the right to counsel on appeal because they “requested, and were 
-5- 
denied, the assistance of counsel on appeal” when the trial judge determined 
that “no good whatever could be served by appointment of counsel.” 
Douglas, 372 U.S. at 354–55. The Court said nothing about waiving the right 
to counsel or separating that right between trial and appeal. It merely held 
that indigent defendants must be extended the same right to counsel as non-
indigent defendants. Id. at 355. 
 Stewart also misconstrues Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005). He 
claims that the Court held that “because the sentencing court did not inform 
[Halbert] of the relevant right (to be appointed appellate counsel) his plea did 
not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Resp.Br.19. That was not 
the holding. Rather, the Court held that a Michigan law that did not 
guarantee counsel to defendants who entered a guilty or no contest plea was 
unconstitutional. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 609–10, 623. In so doing, the Court 
rejected the premise that Halbert had waived his right to appellate counsel 
by entering a no contest plea because under the Michigan law, Halbert “had 
no recognized right to appointed appellate counsel he could elect to forgo.” 
Id. at 623. The Court said nothing about informing a defendant of his right to 
counsel on appeal or whether the failure to do so voided a previously valid 
waiver of the right to counsel. 
-6- 
Moreover, the federal cases Stewart cites about the right to counsel do 
not broaden rule 4(f).  Rule 4(f) is a State procedural accommodation for 
someone who was wholly denied a State right to appeal. Consequently, 
nothing in the federal cases Stewarts cites do or even can inform the analysis 
of what rule 4(f) reaches. Nor do the Utah cases on the right to counsel 
because they are unrelated to rule 4(f) and its limited scope.  
 This Court is the supreme authority on all things rule 4(f) and it has 
held definitively that a person is deprived of his right to appeal only if he has 
been prevented from filing a timely notice of appeal. Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶¶17–
18 (a defendant is denied the right to appeal when he is “prevented” from 
“proceeding” with an appeal, and “proceeding” with an appeal means “filing 
a notice of appeal, not more”) (cleaned up); see Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶42 (“A 
defendant who actually files an appeal…has not been prevented from 
-7- 
proceeding with an appeal”). Whether Stewart’s right to counsel was 
deprived is not an issue rule 4(f) remedies. See Pet.Br.20–22.2 
 Third, Stewart also asserts that at the “heart” of this case is “what 
constitutes a first appeal of right” and he suggests that it requires a ruling on 
the merits. Resp.Br.11. This Court has already rejected that proposition. The 
act of filing a timely notice of appeal allows defendants to “gain[] entry to 
appellate courts” and whether the appeal ends “by a ruling on the merits or 
                                              
2 Stewart’s right to counsel was not violated in any event. Stewart 
waived his right to counsel after he was “fully advised of his right to have 
counsel.” R211. Stewart admitted at the rule 4(f) evidentiary hearing twelve 
years later that he could not remember everything the trial court said at the 
time of his waiver. R1120. And there is no transcript of that hearing. Stewart 
then represented himself at trial and at sentencing. R568–70, 625–27, 678–83. 
He filed a pro se notice of appeal and docketing statement without ever 
requesting counsel. Even after his appeal concluded, Stewart filed “several” 
post-conviction petitions, R729–30, 936, numerous motions with the trial 
court, R737–38, 762–67, 771, 774–75, 780–81, and another direct appeal to 
challenge the denial of those motions, R808, 818–19, 827, without ever 
complaining of his lack of counsel on appeal.  
There is no dispute that Stewart waived his right to counsel, and there 
is no dispute that Stewart did nothing to indicate that he had changed his 
mind for his appeal. Neither Stewart nor the court of appeals cite any 
authority holding that a valid waiver of the right to counsel expires when the 
trial proceedings are over, requiring another waiver before the appeal. Other 
States reject such a requirement. See, e.g., State v. Tharp, 395 N.W.2d 762, 765 
(Neb. 1986) (waiver of counsel at trial and pro se appeal constituted waiver of 
right to counsel on appeal).  
Under rule 4(f) it is Stewart’s burden to prove a deprivation of the right 
to appeal. He failed to do that here where, even assuming the lack of counsel 
could violate the right to appeal, he did not prove that he was denied counsel. 
-8- 
involuntary dismissal,” they “have exhausted their remedy of direct appeal 
and are thereby drawn into the ambit of the PCRA.” Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶18. 
Filing a timely notice of appeal constitutes “proceeding” with a first appeal 
of right, even if the merits are not reached. Id. Again, the question under rule 
4(f) is not whether a defendant’s appeal was meaningful—the rule stops short 
of inquiring what happens on appeal because one “who actually files an 
appeal…has not been prevented from proceeding with an appeal.” Collins, 
2014 UT 61, ¶42. The question is whether an appeal was wholly denied. Here, 
it was not. 
 In sum, Stewart seeks to uphold the court of appeals’ decision by 
adding requirements that this Court has already foreclosed. The Court 
should reverse the court of appeals’ decision and reaffirm that the limited 
nature of the reinstatement remedy applies only when a defendant was 
prevented from filing a timely notice of appeal. 
2. This Court should reject Stewart’s invitation to 
disavow its precedent 
 Stewart makes two arguments challenging the validity of this Court’s 
decision in Rees.  
 First, he claims that the court of appeals was correct when it held that 
Rees’ holding that proceeding with an appeal means filing a timely notice of 
appeal, not more, does not apply to a defendant who did not have counsel on 
-9- 
appeal. Resp.Br.25–27; see Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶10 n.1. Stewart asserts 
that “Rees could not allege that he was deprived of his first right of appeal” 
and the Court “concluded that reinstatement was not appropriate” because 
Rees had counsel and his case was decided on the merits. Resp.Br.26, 43. But 
that was not the reason this Court denied reinstatement; it was because Rees 
filed a timely notice of appeal. Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶¶17–20. The State addressed 
this argument further in its opening brief. Pet.Br.17–22. 
 Stewart also argues that the interpretation of “proceeding with an 
appeal” in paragraph 18 in Rees “should be disavowed” because it 
purportedly conflicts with rule 4(f), Manning, and decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court. Resp.Br.27–32. He refers to it as “a single, short 
paragraph” in the opinion. Resp.Br.25. But it is not just an inconsequential 
paragraph. It is part of the Court’s holding in the case and a fundamental 
interpretation of the reinstatement remedy. 
 The Manning Court created the reinstatement remedy to “provide a 
readily accessible and procedurally simple method” to restore an 
unconstitutionally denied right to appeal—“when a defendant has been 
prevented in some meaningful way from proceeding with a first appeal of 
right.” Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶¶24, 26 (cleaned up). But the Court did not say 
what it means to “proceed” with an appeal. Two months later, the Court 
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answered that question in Rees: “We construe the act of ‘proceeding’ with an 
appeal to encompass filing a notice of appeal, not more.” Rees, 2005 UT 69, 
¶18. This paragraph is central to the Court’s decision in Rees and to the proper 
interpretation of Manning and rule 4(f). 
 Stewart, therefore, bears a heavy burden by asking this Court to 
disavow Rees. “Parties who ask this court to overturn prior precedent have a 
substantial burden of persuasion.” State v. Allgier, 2017 UT 84, ¶17, 416 P.3d 
546 (cleaned up). That “substantial burden” requires a defendant “to 
persuade [the Court] that [its] precedent is not sufficiently weighty or 
supported, or that it works poorly.” Id. ¶21. Stewart has not met his burden. 
 As explained in the State’s opening brief, the only purpose of rule 4(f) 
is to allow a defendant who was prevented from filing a notice of appeal 
during the original 30-day period to have a second chance to file a timely 
notice of appeal. That purpose is clear from this Court’s unbroken precedent 
beginning with the original Johnson remedy, through Manning, and 
continuing with Rees and Collins. Pet.Br.12–17. 
 Stewart makes three futile attempts to show how Rees is inconsistent 
with the purpose of rule 4(f) and other authorities.  
 First, he challenges Rees’ definition of “proceeding” by offering a 
dictionary definition of the nouns “proceedings” and “proceeding,” not the 
-11- 
verb for the act of “proceeding” with an appeal that Rees defined. Resp.Br.28 
n.9; see Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶18 (“We construe the act of ‘proceeding’ with an 
appeal…”). Obviously, offering a definition of a different word has no 
bearing on this Court’s interpretation of the actual word at issue. 
 Second, Stewart relies on the United States Supreme Court’s 
statements in Garza v. Idaho, 139 S.Ct. 738, 745–46 (2019), that the act of filing 
a notice of appeal is a “purely ministerial task” and a “simple, nonsubstantive 
act,” but he ignores its context. See Resp.Br. at 29. The Garza Court explained 
that filing a notice of appeal is “a simple, nonsubstantive act that is within the 
defendant’s prerogative.” Garza, 139 S.Ct. at 745–46. The Court held that 
counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal at defendant’s request 
constitutes deficient performance, and prejudice is presumed because that 
failure deprives a defendant of his right to appeal by forfeiting the appellate 
process altogether. Id. at 746–47. The Supreme Court did not downplay the 
importance of filing a timely notice of appeal. To the contrary, consistent with 
rule 4(f), it held that counsel’s failure to do so deprives a defendant of his 
right to appeal. Id.  
 Rees is fully consistent with Garza because it cures the only error Garza 
dealt with—it reopens the appellate courthouse doors when they are closed 
by not timely filing a notice of appeal. See Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶18. Because 
-12- 
nothing in Garza looks beyond that threshold, Rees does not conflict with it 
by remaining at the threshold.  
 Third, Stewart returns again to his main point—that not informing him 
of his right to counsel on appeal denied him “the right to meaningful access to 
the appellate process.” Resp.Br.29–32 (emphasis added). Once again, rule 4(f) 
is not concerned with a “meaningful” appeal—whether a defendant has 
counsel or not, whether counsel is excellent or deficient, whether an appeal 
is successful or a complete failure—it is only concerned about whether the 
opportunity to have an appeal at all is denied because something outside a 
defendant’s control prevented him from timely appealing. Stewart cites no 
authority to show that Rees’ interpretation of “proceeding with an appeal” is 
inconsistent with the purpose of rule 4(f), or that it “is not sufficiently weighty 
-13- 
or supported, or that it works poorly.” Allgier, 2017 UT 84, ¶21. Stewart’s 
request that the Court disavow paragraph 18 of Rees should be denied.3 
B. Stewart is incorrect that the court of appeals could 
reverse the trial court’s conclusion that Stewart failed 
to meet his burden of proof  
 Stewart bore the burden of proving a denial of his right to appeal by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Utah R. App. P. 4(f). The only evidence he 
presented to support his claim that he was not informed of his right to counsel 
on appeal was his “self-serving and not detailed” testimony twelve years 
later, which was also replete with memory deficiencies. See Stewart, 2018 UT 
App 151, ¶21. The trial court described it as a “mere claim,” and ruled that it 
failed to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. R1156–57. The 
only logical conclusion that can be drawn from the trial court’s ruling is that 
                                              
3 Stewart also claims that his denial of counsel on appeal is a structural 
error not subject to harmless error review. Resp.Br.40–42. This argument also 
improperly focuses the question on the possible denial of his right to counsel, 
which may not be raised under rule 4(f). Stewart’s reliance on Penson v. Ohio, 
488 U.S. 75 (1988), in misplaced. See Resp.Br.41–42. There, the Ohio Court of 
Appeals allowed Penson’s attorney to withdraw without following the 
procedures outlined in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and refused 
to grant Penson new counsel upon his request. Penson, 488 U.S. at 81–83. That 
error violated Penson’s right to counsel and prejudice was presumed. Id. at 
88. But here, the question is whether Stewart was denied his right to appeal 
and thus merits reinstatement under rule 4(f)—a question that Penson does 
not address and one which this Court has held is subject to harmless error 
review. See Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶¶40–43. 
-14- 
the court found Stewart’s memory unreliable and his testimony incredible. 
The court of appeals should have affirmed. Pet.Br. 26–32. 
 The court of appeals, however, determined that the trial court did not 
make findings about the credibility of Stewart’s testimony and that because 
the State did not present its own evidence, Stewart’s testimony had to be 
given some weight. See Stewart, 2018 UT 151, ¶22. This was error as it 
amounted to the court of appeals making a credibility determination, which 
it may not do. 
 Stewart agrees that the trial court did not make factual findings. 
Resp.Br.34–36 (“the district court’s ruling had nothing to do with factual 
findings”). But he argues that there was no error because neither court made 
factual findings and the court of appeals merely corrected the trial court’s 
“legal error” that Stewart’s memory-based testimony was not enough 
evidence to prove his claim. Resp.Br.32–40. Stewart’s arguments are 
unavailing for three reasons. 
 First, Stewart’s contention that “the district court’s conclusion was not 
based on facts” is wrong. Resp.Br.37. Whether Stewart was informed about 
his right to counsel on appeal is a factual issue that the trial court, as finder-
-15- 
of-fact, was obligated to decide.4 Utah R. App. P. 4(f) (reinstatement is 
appropriate “[i]f the trial court finds” that defendant was denied his right to 
appeal); Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶31 (defendant must prove deprivation “based 
on facts in the record or determined through additional evidentiary 
hearings”). Stewart testified, the State cross-examined him, and the trial court 
had to “balance the evidence, using discretion to weigh its importance and 
credibility, and decide whether” it is “more likely than not” that Stewart’s 
allegations were true. See State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (describing the preponderance of the evidence standard).  
 Although the trial court’s findings were not explicit, it had to make 
them in order to decide the motion. By referring to Stewart’s testimony as a 
“mere claim” and denying his motion, it was reasonable to assume that the 
trial court found Stewart’s testimony not credible. And that assumption is 
reasonable. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787 (appellate courts “assume that the 
trier of facts found them in accord with its decision” and affirm if “it would 
be reasonable to find facts to support it”) (cleaned up). After all, Stewart 
never complained about his lack of counsel on appeal in the twelve years 
between his conviction and his rule 4(f) motion, despite several opportunities 
                                              
4 Assuming that this fact is germane to rule 4(f), which the State 
disputes. See Part I(A), supra. 
-16- 
to do so. See supra n.2. When he finally did complain he was inconsistent, and 
his memory was poor. He claimed in his pro se rule 4(f) motion that he was 
not informed of his right to counsel because he could not hear anything at all 
at his sentencing. R874–75. But he made no such hearing-based claim during 
his testimony. He claimed only that the court did not inform him about the 
right to counsel on appeal, even though he admitted he could not remember 
everything the court said. R1119–25.  
 It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to be unpersuaded by 
Stewart’s self-serving, undetailed, and contradictory claim, which was based 
on a poor memory, after many years during which he failed to raise his claim 
in any form. See State v. Robles-Vazquez, 2015 UT App 108, ¶¶7–10, 349 P.3d 
769 (affirming denial of rule 4(f) motion without express findings because 
trial court said defendant’s testimony “seem[ed] disingenuous” because it 
took him three years to raise claim). The court of appeals should have 
affirmed. See Pet.Br. 26–32. 
 Second, even if the trial court truly made no findings (or it was 
unreasonable to assume it found Stewart not credible), the court of appeals 
still erred when it did not remand so the trial court could make the necessary 
factual findings. As stated, factual findings were necessary to decide the 
motion. And only the trial court can make factual findings: “it is not the 
-17- 
function of an appellate court to make findings of fact because it does not 
have the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses testify.” Rucker v. Dalton, 
598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). The very greatest relief the court of appeals 
could have given Stewart was to remand to have the trial court make the 
findings that only it could make, not make the findings on its own. See State 
v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ¶¶24–27, 282 P.3d 998; Pet.Br.27–29.  
 Finally, Stewart argues that the court of appeals did not make its own 
findings as to Stewart’s credibility. Rather, he claims that the court merely 
corrected the trial courts erroneous conclusion that “as a matter of 
law…anything short of a transcript of the sentencing hearing would be 
insufficient to support Stewart’s claim that he was not informed of the right 
to counsel.” Resp.Br.34–39. Even if that was all the court of appeals did, it still 
should have remanded for the trial court to make the necessary findings.   
 But the court of appeals did more than tell the trial court that it made 
an erroneous legal conclusion. It also decided for the trial court that Stewart’s 
testimony “tended to prove that [he] was not informed of his right to counsel 
on appeal” and held that it met the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Stewart, 2018 UT 151, ¶22. His testimony only “tended to prove” his claim if 
what he said was true, which is a factual finding that the court of appeals is 
not authorized to make. “We emphasize that the weighing of the evidence is 
-18- 
to be done by the trial court, not this court.” Archuleta, 812 P.2d at 83 n.2; see 
Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1338.  
 Stewart contends that the court of appeals’ holding that Stewart’s 
testimony alone carried his burden is “logical,” “uncontroversial,” and a 
“simple, elegant resolution” of the issue. Resp.Br.39–40. But it was an 
erroneous overstep of the court of appeals’ authority. The court of appeals 
determined that Stewart’s testimony was sufficient to meet his burden of 
proof based on its own finding that Stewart’s testimony was reliable because 
it was uncontradicted. See Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶¶21–22 & n.6. But that 
finding was wrong for two reasons: (1) it conflicted with the trial court’s 
implicit conclusion that Stewart’s testimony was not credible; and (2) it was 
an appellate finding of reliability that an appellate court is not allowed to 
make. And an appellate finding does not become permissible merely because 
the State had no affirmative contrary proof. A fact-finder may find even 
uncontradicted evidence to be inherently incredible. See Pet.Br.29–30. 
 It was error for the court of appeals to accept Stewart’s testimony from 
a cold record at face value and conclude that it met his burden of proof. For 
all the court of appeals knew, Stewart exhibited during his testimony a 
demeanor, body language, voice inflection, and other behaviors—all 
unknowable from a transcript—that indicated that he was, if not outright 
-19- 
lying, at least propping up an admittedly incomplete memory of what 
happened twelve years earlier with “self-serving” testimony. By finding 
Stewart’s testimony “insufficient,” the trial court implicitly gave Stewart’s 
testimony no weight. The court of appeals erred by deciding for itself that the 
testimony was sufficient to meet his burden of proof. This Court should 
reverse. 
C. Other procedures are available to seek redress for the 
alleged denial of the right to counsel on appeal 
 Stewart argues that reinstatement is the “only remedy for redress of 
the loss of his first right of appeal, due to the denial of his right to appellate 
counsel.” Resp.Br.42. He is incorrect. Rule 4(f) is an “improper procedural 
vessel for bringing” a claimed deprivation of the right to counsel on appeal. 
See Sandoval v. State, 2019 UT 13, ¶13, —P.3d—. But other procedural 
remedies are available for such claims. 
 First, Stewart could have requested counsel at any time during his 
appeal. He did not. And had such a request been denied, or had Stewart 
otherwise believed that he his right to counsel had been violated, he could 
have raised a claim for denial of counsel in his first appeal of right. He did 
not. 
Second, the law provided Stewart a remedy for errors relating to his 
right to counsel on appeal—post-conviction relief.  Stewart could have raised 
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his present claim in one of his “several” post-conviction petitions. See R729–
30, 936; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102(1) (West 2017) (PCRA is “sole 
remedy” for defendants who have “exhausted all other legal remedies, 
including a direct appeal”); Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶18 (defendants whose appeals 
are dismissed involuntarily following a timely notice of appeal are “drawn 
into the ambit of the PCRA”). Again, he did not.  
 Stewart argues that, unlike Rees, he may not seek post-conviction relief 
for the alleged denial of his right to counsel on appeal because of his twelve-
year delay. Resp.Br.44. It is possible that Stewart’s lengthy delay precludes 
post-conviction relief either because it is beyond the one-year statute of 
limitations or because it could have been raised in a prior appeal or request 
for post-conviction relief. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1). But Stewart 
does not contend that he could not have raised it at an earlier time.  
 In sum, rule 4(f) is not the appropriate avenue to challenge the alleged 
denial of the right to counsel on appeal, especially for a defendant, like 
Stewart, who already appealed. Stewart may have forfeited his claim by 
waiting twelve years to raise it. But that does not mean that no remedy 
existed. Stewart’s failure to raise his claim through the proper procedures at 




 For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in the State’s opening 
brief, the Court should reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 Respectfully submitted on April 8, 2019. 
  SEAN D. REYES 
  Utah Attorney General 
 
/s/ Jeffrey D. Mann  
  JEFFREY D. MANN 
  Assistant Solicitor General 
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